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Mayer: They Asked For More: Noncriminal Procedural Due Process

THEY ASKED FOR MORE: NONCRIMINAL

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The plight of the hapless individual confronted with the
overwhelming and often capricious power of a Kafkaesque bureaucracy has been a pervasive motif of this century.' The exponential growth of government within the framework of the welfare
state brought increased intrusion into the affairs of individuals.
Though new social programs provided benefits to many, those
benefits were conferred at the government's discretion. The government was insulated from the constitutional constraints of due
process by the right-privilege doctrine, by a definition of property
limited to interests in real or liquid assets, and by a definition of
liberty apprehended within the context of criminal or tort law.
. In recent years, the Supreme Court evidenced a willingness
to expand the concept of property rights. In a series of decisions
beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.2 and Goldberg
v. Kelly,3 the Supreme Court recognized the relative impotence
of the impecunious citizen and found the individual's reliance on
statutorily conferred benefits to be a property interest substantial
enough to warrant the protection of constitutional due process.
The right-privilege distinction was discredited and generally considered to be abandoned. The protection of the individual subjected to serious consequences by government action became a
prime concern of the Supreme Court.4 Consistent with this new
attitude of the Court, the concept of liberty was similarly broadened 5 to afford further protection to an individual subjected to
government-inflicted injury.
1. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245, 1246 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Verkuil, The
Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 845, 855-56
(1975). See also Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAv. L.
REv. 1669, 1718 (1975).
2. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
3. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
4. Goldberg and Sniadach were followed by a series of decisions expanding due process rights to new interests in new contexts. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); and, more recently, Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), and North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). See also Stewart, supra note 1: "But with the
expansion of the governmental role, it became less and less tolerable that the government
should wield the degree of potentially arbitrary power over the lives of individuals. .. .
Id. at 1718. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975), speaks of a
"due process explosion." Id. at 1268.
5. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
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During the 1975 Term, dissenting Justices accused the majority of returning to the right-privilege distinction by permitting
legislative bodies to set due process limitations within statutes
conferringproperty interests. These dissenters were particularly
concerned that the procedural limitations could be immune from
constitutional scrutiny by the Court." Evidence to support this
concern may be found in the current marked reluctance to admit
to the existence of property rights absent a clear and unequivocal
statutory entitlement.7 This contrasts with recent holdings which
recognized justifiable reliance8 and reasonable expectancy9 as
bases for entitlement to due process review. The Supreme Court
similarly restricted the scope of liberty interests by requiring that
prior to constitutional review of alleged deprivations, a complainant show that government action which impugned his or her
reputation resulted in actual loss.10
When the Court undertook constitutional review of statutorily prescribed procedures, it was unclear whether the Court approved a procedure because a legislature had adopted it or
whether the Court subjected such requirements to genuine constitutional scrutiny." Courts undertake consideration of procedures
to decide the scope of process necessary to protect the individual's
constitutional rights. This determination generally requires an
interest-balancing analysis 12 which weighs the individual's potential "grievous loss" against the government's fiscal and adminis(1971); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). See Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See also Justice Stevens's dissent in Mea.
chum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976), on the origin of liberty interests. But see Bishop v.
Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976).
6. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, J.): "More basically, the Court's approach is a resurrection of the discredited
rights/privileges distinction. . . " Id. at 2082 n.4. See also id. at 2083 (White J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
7. See generally Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). Justice Blackmun's dissent
attacks the interpretations of the precedents relied on by the majority. Id. at 2085.
8. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972). The decision also dis.
cusses implied contract as a basis for relief. Id. at 601-02.
10. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09
(1976).
11. See Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2537-40 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334-49 (1976). From the logic of the opinions, it is hard to be sure.
12. See Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2539-40 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976). Interest-balancing analysis dates back to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
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trative interests. 3 The decisions last Term disclose increasing
sensitivity to the cost and inconvenience of affording due process
4
and a concomitant reduced concern for individual interests.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

1975-1976 TEAM

Noncriminal due process 5 demands were presented to the
Supreme Court last Term in cases involving termination of public
17
employment, 6 termination of social security disability benefits,
and prisoners' rights. 8 Appeals for due process, or for more adequate process, were denied in each of these cases.
Due process decisions do not reach the merits of a case. Litigants hope to win only the right to a fair hearing with'a record
for appeal, a neutral arbiter, and some opportunity to confront
or cross-examine witnesses. Noncriminal due process is a flexible
concept 9 which can be adapted to provide appropriate safeguards
in the wide variety of contexts in which it has been invoked.
The right to some sort of hearing before deprivation of a
property or liberty interest is an integral part of the Constitution.
It would seem incontestable that a prior hearing is required whenever an individual may suffer a loss by action of the government.0
It is worth noting, therefore, the negativism with which the present Court has met attempts to require or expand constitutionally
mandated process. Although there had been indications in recent
sessions that the Court was reassessing previous expansive deci13. See Justice Stevens's dissent in Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2540-43 (1976),
which discusses the limits of legislative power.
14. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976) (denying prisoner's right to
transcript of trial court for collateral appeal). In MacCollom Justice Brennan dissented
and discussed the issues of cost. Id. at 2094. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551,
1556, 1559-60 (1976) (in reversing district court and circuit court decisions which granted
due process rights in all prison disciplinary hearings, the Court gave great weight to the
administrative burden of affording full due process rights); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 347-48 (1976) (incremental cost and administrative burden, though not controlling,
must be weighed).
15. "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. "[Njor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
16. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
17. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
18. Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532
(1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Enomoto v. Clutchette, 425 U.S. 308
(1976).
19. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
577 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp.
294, 302 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
20. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
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sions, constraint was more evident and more successful this
Term.
Examination of recent decisions discloses a variety of reasons
underlying the Court's shift in attitude. Both the opinions of the
Court2 and those of commentators2 2 have voiced concern for the

high cost to the government of providing Court-mandated procedure as well as for the inefficiency and delay attributed to adequate procedures. There has been particular dismay at the increased intervention by federal courts into the affairs of state and
local governments, and at the increased litigation stemming from
the broad-based and multitudinous claims of due process denial.Y
These problems are present in all their complexity when the
Court considers an appeal by a public employee claiming to have
been arbitrarily discharged or denied renewal of employment. In
its consideration of the rights of public employees, the Court has
frequently faced issues of federalism as well as problems of cost,
delay, and proliferation of litigation financed by organized groups
of employees. 24 The Court that decided NationalLeague of Cities
v. Usery25 obviously heeded criticism that federal courts have
become adjuncts to the personnel offices of municipal and state
agencies. 21 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Bishop v.
Wood, 2 stated: "The federal court is not the appropriate forum
in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are
made daily by public agencies." 8
21. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2092, 2098 (1976); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168-69 n.4 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring); Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 221-27 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
22. Friendly, supra note 4, at 1276, 1284 n.91; Stewart, supra note 1, at 1784. See
generally Verkuil, supra note 1. But see Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due
Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
23. Friendly, supra note 4, at 1284 n.91; Merill, Procedures for Adverse Actions
Against FederalEmployers, 59 VA. L. Rav. 196, 198-99 (1973). But see id. at 199 n.14 for
an account of the lack of procedural rights of a discharged government employee (under
the Lloyd-La Follette Act) in 1938. See also Note, The Due Process Rights of Public
Employees, 50 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 310, 344-45 (1975).
24. Note, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 23, at 345 n.200 (concerning the establishment of the Du Shayne Emergency Fund of the National Education Association to finance
litigation of teachers' rights). See also City of Chicago v. Confederation of Police, 96 S.
Ct. 3186 (1976).
25. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). In a five-four decision, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, opined that the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, extending
wage and hours regulations to public employees of states and their political subdivisions,
were invalid.
26. Id. at 2471.
27. 96 S.Ct. 2074 (1976).
28. Id. at 2080.
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Relevant to the concern for states' rights and judicial economy is the necessity for federal courts to interpret local
ordinances or state laws to meet the threshold question of entitlement. Entitlement has been found both in statutory language
and, by implication, in the reasonable expectancy 29 of an individual to, for example, continued employment, though clear and
specific indication of the employer's intention is lacking. This
initial and crucial determination has virtually compelled a caseby-case approach requiring the federal courts to construe the
intricacies and purposes of ordinances, statutes, rules, and regulations" relevant to a particular claim. Few precedents have been
established upon which to decide succeeding cases. Bishop v.
Wood," decided last Term, presented the issues so ambiguously
that little clarification or certainty emerged to guide lower courts.32
However, a comparison of Bishop with Mathews v. Eldridge,
which presented a claim for a pretermination hearing by a social
security recipient, leads to certain conclusions about the Court's
attitude toward the interests of the individual (as opposed to the
state) and its curious and illogical compartmentalization of due
process decisions.
In Bishop v. Wood, 33 petitioner, Carl Bishop, had been em-

ployed as a policeman in Marion, North Carolina. After six
months as a probationer, he was given status as a "permanent
employee," subject to dismissal for certain causes listed in the
Marion Personnel Ordinance. After two years as a "permanent
employee," he was dismissed by the city manager 34pursuant to the
Ordinance's minimal requirements for dismissal.
29. "[Tlhe relevant inquiry is whether it was objectively reasonable for the employee
to believe he could rely on continued employment." Id. at 2082 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In various decisions, different phrases have been used *to identify the entitle-

ment. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (implied contract); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) ("legitimate claim of entitlement"); Stretten v. Wadsworth

Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976) (oral promise of continued employment plus
usual practice of employer); Assaf v. University of Texas Sys., 399 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D.
Tex. 1975) ("justified expectations").
30. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See also Barrett v. Smith, 530 F.2d
829 (9th Cir. 1975) (violation of Police Department Rules and Regulations); Hostrop v.
Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
963 (1976) (policies and procedures of the Junior College Board); Rew v. Ward, 402 F.
3-81 (1974)); Assaf v.
Supp. 331 (D.N.M. 1975) (Air Force regulations AFM 39-10,
University of Tex. Sys., 399 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
31. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
32. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
33. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).

34. Id. Marion, N.C., Personnel Ordinance art. II, § 6 states:
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In the Supreme Court, petitioner argued that as a designated
"permanent employee" he had a property interest in continued
employment and was thereby entitled to constitutional due process, specifically, a pretermination hearing before discharge. Petitioner also argued that discharge for cause stigmatized him,
requiring a hearing permitting him to contest the charges and
clear his name, in recognition of his liberty interest in reputation.
Unlike Arnett v. Kennedy,3 5 the Court's 1974 public employment due process decision in which the petitioner was a federal
civil service employee with acknowledged tenure under a statute
providing considerable procedure both before and after dismissal,
the petitioner in Bishop was employed under a municipal ordinance providing virtually no procedure. A decision in Bishop's
favor would have required the Court to order a municipal government not only to afford a fair hearing to Bishop, possibly resulting
in reinstatement or revision of his personnel record, but also to
rewrite its Personnel Ordinance. The Court in Bishop, reluctant
to undertake this kind of intervention in local government,"
might well have been influenced by the implications of the remedy when it refused to find a property or liberty interest at stake.
THE PROPERTY INTEREST
"This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing
is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property
interest."" "'The plurality opinion . . . would lead directly to
the conclusion that whatever the nature of an individual'sstatutorily createdproperty interest, deprivationof that interest could
be accomplished without notice or a hearingat any time.' "38

Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period
of time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must do
if his work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work
up to the standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager.
Any discharged employee shall be given written notice of his discharge setting
forth the effective date and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such a
notice.
96 S. Ct. at 2077 n.5.
35. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
36. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976). See also note 26 supra and note 63 infra.
37. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (emphasis added) (citing Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)). The majority opinion was written by Justice
Powell.
38. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (1976) (White, J., dissenting, joined by
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The Supreme Court has been ambivalent toward public
employees seeking constitutional procedural safeguards. This attitude is manifest in Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Bishop
v. Wood, which found "tenable" the district court's conclusion
that under the Marion ordinance petitioner had no property interest29
However troublesome the Court's decision to accept uncritically a district judge's construction of an ambiguously phrased
ordinance without considering the reasonable expectations that
"permanent employee" status induced in the petitioner,4" the
dictum in Bishop is even more objectionable. This dictum suggests, contrary to the opinions of six Justices in Arnett,4 that a
statute or ordinance which confers property rights in employment
and which includes its own procedures is not subject to constitutional review.12 Such a proposition implies that some property
may be taken without constitutional due process. The majority
Brennan, Marshall & Blackman, JJ.) (emphasis added) (quoting Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166 (1974)). Though concurring in Arnett,
Justice Powell specifically rejected Justice Rehnquist's view that an employee's only right
to due process was that contained within the statute conferring the property interest in
employment. He insisted that constitutional analysis was necessary when reviewing the
adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest.
416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring). A comparison of these two statements by Justice
Powell (quoted in the text) with his concurrence in Bishop underscores the inconsistency
referred to by the dissenters in Bishop.
39. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (1976).
40. Id. at 2082 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe strained reading of the local ordinance . . . ."). See also id. at 2083 (White, J. dissenting); id. at 2085 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he only North Carolina case cited by the Court and by the District
Court is by no means the authoritative holding on state law that the Court. . . seems to
think it is.").
41. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Six Justices (White, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Powell & Douglas) disagreed with the opinion written by Justice Rehnquist,
which reasoned that the employee's procedural rights were "conditioned by the procedural
limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest . . . ." Id. at 155. They
insisted such rights were derived from the constitutional guarantees of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined the
Rehnquist opinion in toto.
42. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2078 nn. 8 & 9. The Court accepted the lower
court ruling that once a city ordinance and state law have been complied with, there is
no further need to review the procedure. The majority read the lack of substantial procedure within the ordinance as evidence that no property interest had been conferred. "In
this case, whether we accept or reject the construction of the ordinance adopted by the
two lower courts, the power to change or clarify that ordinance will remain in the hands
of the City Council of the City of Marion." Id. at 2080 n.14. See also id. at 2084 (White,
J., dissenting): "The right to his job apparently given by the first two sentences of the
ordinance is thus redefined, according to the majority, by the procedures provided for in
the third sentence and as redefined is infringed only if the procedures are not followed."
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opinion evoked angry dissents by Justices Brennan,13 White," and
Blackmun,4 5 all taking umbrage at the implication that the Court
might be returning, at least in termination of employment cases,
to the right-privilege distinction theretofore considered defunct."
The propriety of constitutional oversight of statutory procedure was not reached by the Court's holding in Bishop, which
eliminated both the property and liberty claims at the threshold;
given another situation the Court might reaffirm the validity of
constitutional review upon deprivation of property rights in employment.
In Bishop v. Wood, the swing vote in support of Justice
Stevens's opinion was cast by Justice Powell. Because Justices
Rehnquist, Burger and Stewart had formed the minority in
Arnett,41 which found statutory grants of permanent employment
self-limiting, it was foreseeable that they would not object to the
Bishop decision or its controversial underlying rationale. It is
difficult to discern whether Justice Powell's concurrence was limited to the holding of the case or whether it included the dictum
as well.
As recently as the 1974 decision in Arnett," Justice Powell
stated in a separate opinion: "While the legislature may elect not
to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest,
once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. ' 4 He
specifically objected to the plurality reasoning, which concluded
that a statute which determines the nature of the property interest may also determine the procedural safeguards to be accorded
that interest.50 Although Arnett dealt with a federal statute,5 ' the
principle at issue should be the same in a case involving a state
statute or a local ordinance." - Given a case in which petitioner
had clear, undisputed statutory entitlement, Justice Powell
43. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2083 (White, J., dissenting).

45. Id. at 2085 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. See notes 4 & 6 supra. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 &
n.9 (1972); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinctionin Constitutional
Law, 81 HAav.L. Rav. 1439 (1968).
47. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
48. Id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 166. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
51. The Lloyd-La Follette Act was involved.
52. See note 91 infra. See also 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
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might require a constitutional due process analysis, regardless of
the level of government which granted the interest. Justice Powell's position in upcoming employment cases may thus depend
on the language granting the entitlement.
Justice Stewart's concurrence with the plurality opinion in
Arnett and with the majority in Bishop reflects a curious rejection
of his own seminal opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth 3 which,
together with Perry v. Sindermann,54 laid the foundation for the
procedural due process claims made by government employees
threatened with discharge. His recent attitude toward these demands for due process in public employment cases also contrasts
sharply with his earlier enthusiasm for the Court's decision in
North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,5 5 which invalidated a garnishment statute for insufficient procedural protection.THE LIBERTY INTEREST

"Notice and full prior hearing must ordinarily be provided
where the challenged governmental action imposes upon the
individual 'a stigma or other disability that foreclose[s] his freedom to take advantage of other. . . opportunities.'""
Justice Rhenquist, writing for the Court in Paul v. Davis,5 8
denied petitioners' claim that the distribution of a defamatory
flyer had deprived them of a "liberty" interest in reputation, and
definitively stated that defamation alone was not sufficient to
establish a claim to the procedural guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment: "[Tihe defamation had to occur in the course of
termination of employment."5 9 The Paul opinion, written less
0 was influenced to some dethan three months prior to Bishop,"
gree by the Court's reluctance to establish a section 19831 general
federal tort liability for defamation,62 which was certainly not an
53. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
54. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
55. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
56. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
57. Corr v. Mattheis, 407 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D.R.I. 1976) (emphasis added) (quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)). In Corr, a three-judge district court
held students had been deprived of liberty interests without due process of law.
58. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See Note, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv.199 (1976); The Supreme Court,
1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 56, 92-95 & n.44 (1976).
59. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976).
60. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides civil remedies against actions causing deprivation of rights "under color" of law.
62. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976): "But such a reading would make of the
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issue in Bishop. Yet the Court decided in Bishop that there was
no liberty interest at stake when petitioner was discharged for
cause, which he claimed seriously stigmatized his reputation.
The opinion suggests two reasons for denying a liberty interest in
loss of employment cases. The charge may not sufficiently impair
the reputation of the discharged employee so as to require the
protection of due process, or the employee will not suffer actual
injury if the charges are not communicated to others. In Bishop
Justice Stevens relied on the latter reason 3 without considering
that there would almost certainly be future communication of the
petitioner's personnel records to potential future employets;
a communication which could effectively discourage future employment and thus impose upon the individual the very
"disability that foreclosefs] his freedom to take advantage of
other . . . opportunities."64 This

predicament would seem to

require the protection of due process under the decisions in Roth
and Paul.
After Bishop, it is difficult to predict when defamation of
character by government might require the protection of the due
process clause. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Bishop, accused
the Court of destroying the last remaining "vestige of protection
for 'liberty' ",5 after the decision in Paul.
SocL SEcuRITY DISABILITY BENEFITS

Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Mathews v.
Eldridge,6" denied a pretermination hearing to a petitioner whose
social security disability benefits had been terminated, but did
review the constitutional sufficiency of the procedure mandated
by the Social Security Act. He undertook this review using an
interest-balancing technique. Both the district court"7 and the
Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever system may
already be administered by the States . .

.

.[A] fortiori the procedural guarantees of

the Due Process Clause cannot be the source for such law."
63. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (1976) ("public disclosure of the reasons for
the discharge . .

.)

64. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). See note 57 supra.
65. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But note
the contrary attitude of the Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), and
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), where the first amendment rights of the
media were restricted to protect reputation. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 723 n.11
(1976) (Brennan, J, dissenting); Codd v. Velgar, 45 U.S.L.W. 4175 (Feb. 22, 1977).
66. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
67. 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973).
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 8 had held that Eldridge

must be afforded an evidentiary hearing before termination of
benefits. The two decisions relied on Goldberg v. Kelly" in which
the Court, under a different section 0 of the same Act, found that
such hearings were required before termination of welfare benefits. In order to reverse the lower court decision, Justice Powell
had to distinguish the situation of the disability petitioner from
that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg, as well as demonstrate
that the interests of the state in Eldridge consequently required
denial of the petitioner's claim for additional procedure. Justice
Powell undertook the balancing of interests by considering those
factors which favored the petitioner. He took note of the
"torpidity of this administrative review process," 7' "the typically

modest resources" 72 of the disabled worker, and the significant
hardship to the worker and his family if the agency were in error.
Nonetheless the Court concluded that "the disabled worker's
need is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient. 73 To
ameliorate the possibly serious financial position of the erroneously terminated social security recipient, Justice Powell suggested he apply for welfare. 74 The opinion in Eldridge gives considerable weight to the fact that medical records are the basis for
the administrative decisions in disability cases, unlike the varied
information that may be relevant in a Goldberg hearing. "The
conclusions of physicians often are supported by X-rays and the
results of clinical or laboratory tests, information typically more
amenable to written than to oral presentation. ' 75 In Mathews v.
Eldridge, however, the petitioner disputed the nature of his back
pain and claimed that he suffered emotional problems. An oral
hearing might have contributed significantly to an understanding
of his infirmities, and examination of the physicians and their
68. 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974).
69. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

70. Welfare beneficiaries were entitled to a pretermination evidentiary hearing under
Title IV of the Social Security Act. Disability benefits are paid under Title VI. Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970).
71. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 342 & n.27. The dissenters took umbrage with Justice Powell's cavalier
attitude: "lilt is . . . no argument that a worker, who has been placed in the untenable
position of having been denied disability benefits, may still seek other forms of public
assistance." Id. at 350 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
75. Id. at 345. For a similar attitude with respect to medical reports, see Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403-05 (1971).
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reports could well have uncovered uncertainties in the medical
data. In other areas76 of the law, medical records are more
vulnerable to attack.

The opinion considered other factors: "[E]xperience with
the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that
the ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial, ' " 7 and "substantial

weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals" 8 administering the system.
This type of analysis does not make clear just how deprived
and impecunious the petitioner must be, or how overworked the
government bureau must be, to affect the Court's decision regarding the extent of process necessary in a particular situation. By
its case-by-case approach, the Court invites ever more litigation
over its vague standards. 9 Justice Powell's opinion in Mathews
v. Eldridge,8" with its elaborate and traditional procedural due
process analysis, would plainly be inconsistent with his position
in Bishop,8' unless that position is limited to the holding that
Bishop had no property or liberty interest requiring constitutional
review. The alternative would be to suggest that Justice Powell
and perhaps others on the Court would like to compartmentalize
procedural decisions, treating certain types of property with more
deference than others and giving relatively low status to property
rights derived from public employment.
76. For less favorable attitudes toward the uncontestability of medical data, see
Justice Douglas's dissent in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 414 (1971). See also Page
v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 757, 762, 763 (5th Cir. 1963).
77. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
78. Id. at 349.
79. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 214 (1972) (Brennan, Douglas & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting): "We gain a brief respite for ourselves while the Secretary, state agencies
and beneficiaries continue confused and uncertain." Id. Richardson is a case similar to
Mathews. A social security recipient sought a hearing before termination of disability
benefits. New regulations had been promulgated after the procedural inception of the
case, so the Court remanded for reconsideration. The Court's decisions with regard to the
constitutionality of sequestration statutes have also been markedly inconsistent. See
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), and Justice Gibbon's
concurring opinion in Jonnet v. Dollar Say., 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir. 1976), discussed
in text accompanying notes 144-146 infra. See also Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). For a discussion of this area of the law,
see Steinheimer, Jr., Summary Prejudgement Creditor's Remedies and Due Process of
Law: ContinuingUncertaintyafter Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv.

79 (1975).
80. 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
81. Bishop v. Wood, 95 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
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COURT DECISIONS

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to the Second Circuit's decision in Cawley v. Velgar, 2 which will again present to
the Court the issue of a liberty interest in reputation allied to loss
of employment. The petitioner, a policeman discharged for cause,
seeks a due process hearing to clear his name or, alternatively, a
court order to foreclose the communication to prospective employers of stigmatizing material in his personnel file.
An attempt by the Confederation of Police in Chicago 3 to
extend due process hearings to course of employment decisions
which might have serious consequences for the employee reached
the Supreme Court and received summary disposition. It was
remanded to the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of
Montanye v. Haymes,"4 Meachum v. Fano,5 and Bishop v.
Wood.86 Montanye and Meachum denied prisoners the right to
due process before transfer in the course of imprisonment.
One court, still following Roth,87 Sindermann5 and the considered opinion of six Justices in Arnett,8 was able to find
"justified expectation" of continued employment in the nature of
a property interest, which entitled a nontenured state university
professor to a pretermination due process hearing when he did not
receive timely notice of dismissal as required by the university
rules." De facto tenure was an issue in two cases:9 1 A New York
district court found no de facto tenure under state law and terms
of employment; a North Carolina district court found no common
law entitlement on the facts.
82. 525 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom Codd v. Velgar, 45 U.S.L.W. 4175 (Feb.
22, 1977). The Court divided five to four. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and Stevens dissented. The majority found against the petitioner without reaching the constitutional issues.
83. City of Chicago v. Confederation of Police, 96 S. Ct. 3186 (1976). The district
court and court of appeals' decisions are reported at 382 F. Supp. 624 (N.D.Ill. 1974), and
529 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1976), respectively.
84. 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976).
85. 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).
86. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
87. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
88. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
89. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
90. Assaf v. University ofTex. Sys., 399 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See also cases
cited at note 91 infra.
91. Bean v. Taylor, 408 F. Supp. 614 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (the court found no entitlement under state law, administrative rules, or implied contract); Gallagher v. Codd,
407 F. Supp. 956, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[t]he finding of [de facto tenure] is governed
by state law").
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A "substantial delay" in payment of social security benefits
for the aged, blind, and disabled was considered a deprivation of
property entitling the New York petitioner to a hearing.2 But in
1975, the Tenth Circuit anticipated Mathews v. Eldridge3 by
deciding that an opportunity for a subsequent hearing was sufficient due process when social security benefits are withdrawn
completely from a disabled recipient. 4
Teachers, 5 university professors," policemen,9" members of
the Armed Services," and a physician at a Veterans Administration Hospital 9 took their cases to federal courts to seek a hearing
before loss of public employment. It is not yet clear what effect
Bishop will have on such requests for procedural protection from
allegedly arbitrary and capricious decisions by the government as
employer.
LIBERTY BEHIND PRISON WALLS

Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have established that
prisoners do not lose all due process rights as a consequence of
incarceration. They have been found to retain the rights to a
hearing to challenge the decisions of prison administrators and
parole boards that would cause revocation of free time: probation,'9 0 parole,10' or good-time credits.' 2 During the 1975-1976
Term, however, little was achieved by attempts to expand basic
and collateral aspects of due process required by earlier decisions.
In two cases reaching the Court from First and Ninth Circuit
92. Audujar v. Weinberger, 69 F.R.D. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
93. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

94. McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976).
95. Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975).
96. Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976) (President of public junior college); Assaf v. University
of Tex. Sys., 399 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
97. City of Chicago v. Confederation of Police, 96 S. Ct. 3186 (1976); Barrett v. Smith,
530 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1975); Gallagher v. Codd, 407 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Weyenberg v. Town of Menasha, 401 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
98. Rew v. Ward, 402 F. Supp. 331 (D.N.M. 1975); Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air
Force, 45 U.S.L.W. 2075 (D. Colo. July 16, 1976).
99. Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976).
100. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
101. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972): "[The liberty of a parolee . . .
includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty. . . .Its termination calls for some
orderly process, however informal." Id. at 482.
102. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (procedural safeguards before deprivation of good time credits due to allegations of serious misconduct).
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Courts of Appeals, 10 3 the majority of the Supreme Court found
that prison inmates have no right to retained or appointed counsel in disciplinary hearings, and that the procedural safeguards
of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses could be denied by prison officials at their discretion. In an interestbalancing approach, the Court recognized the special problem of
protecting the incarcerated witness once his identity was
known.'04
The opinion, written by Justice White, 15 further held that
although a prisoner could remain silent at a disciplinary hearing,
that silence could be used to support adverse inferences against
him. The Court found no need to upset the "'reasonable accommodation between the interests of the inmates and the needs of
the institution.' "10

In the twin cases, Meachum v. Fano01° and Montanye v.
Haymes,0° the Court deliberately rejected the idea that "any
grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to
invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.",0 9
In a six-three decision, the Court held that an inmate has no
constitutional right to a hearing before transfer, whatever the
motives of the prison administrator, even if the transfer produced
hardship, so long as the conditions of confinement were within
the limits of the original sentence.
In a more controversial decision in a related case,110 the Court
split five to four over the holding that an indigent inmate need
not be provided with a free trial transcript to attack his conviction on the collateral ground that his attorney was inadequate.
The inmate had been granted a hearing on a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255111 to try to show that, for purposes of obtaining such
103. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Enomoto v. Clutchette, 425 U.S. 308

(1976).
104. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321 (1976).
105. There were just two dissenters: Justices Brennan and Marshall.
106. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 324 (1976) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 572 (1974)).
107. 96 S.Ct. 2532 (1976). Meachum and Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976),
were considered separately on the same day. Both dealt with transfer from one state prison
facility to another. Montanye involved a New York statute and Meachum involved a
Massachusetts law.
108. 96 S.Ct. 2543 (1976).
109. Meachum v. Fano, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976).
110. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S.Ct. 2086 (1976). Plaintiff in MacCollom
sought a free transcript rather than due process per se. The resolution by the Court was
consistent with that given due process appeals by prisoners this term.
111. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S.Ct. 2086 (1976). See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 753 (f),
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a transcript, his claim was not frivolous. The dissent maintained
that the trial judge could have no rational basis on which to judge
the propriety of the claim without the very transcript requested
by the petitioner.
Last Term the Court granted certiorari to the Fourth Circuit
to hear a case which arose in North Carolina"' and which raises
the question whether the due process clause requires the state
Department of Corrections to provide inmates with legal research
facilities. The district court found without merit North Carolina's
claim that it was not so required. Access to material from which
the inmate can ascertain his legal rights notwithstanding his lack
of expertise might well be justified constitutionally, given the
many situations in which the prisoner is denied counsel"' or the
indigent inmate is denied assigned counsel."'
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Civil commitment also deprives the individual of liberty and
requires due process of law. As a result of the Court's 1975 decision in O'Connorv. Donaldson,"5 limiting the power of the state
to confine the mentally ill, there has been increased scrutiny of
the sufficiency of the procedure used to incarcerate for incapacity
or psychiatric maladjustment. Although there were no commitment due process cases before the Court during the 1975-1976
Term, the Court has noted probable jurisdiction in two cases"'
questioning the rights of parents to waive their children's procedural rights in precommitment hearings. The district court noted
2255 (1970). The petitioner had not appealed his sentence originally. Two years later he
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970). His motion was dismissed by the district court but, on appeal, the court of appeals
reversed and the Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
112. Bounds v. Smith, 538 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425 U.S. 910 (1976).
113. Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974) (no right to "retained or appointed

counsel in disciplinary hearings" even if "charges involve conduct punishable as a crime
under state law"). See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1556 (1976); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (appointed counsel is required in parole revocation proceedings under some circumstances). In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973), the
Court left the decision with respect to counsel to be made on a case-by-case basis. See
Note, Due Process and Parole Revocation: Pro'ipt Hearings for IncarceratedParolees,
WAsH. U.L.Q. 800, 804 n.23 (1975).
114. See note 113 supra.See also Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1976).
115. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
116. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 141 (M.D. Ga. 1976), prob. juris. noted, 425 U.S.
909 (1976); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), prob. juris.noted, 424
U.S. 964 (1976).
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in Bartley v. Kremens"7 that children's "interest in being free
from the wrongful and unwarranted deprivation of their liberty
is substantial . . . ."I" Balancing the interests of the state
against those of the child, the court held that no prior hearing was
necessary, but an immediate postcommitment hearing on probable cause must be held and, if probable cause is found, a more
extensive hearing must follow within two weeks with the right to
appointed counsel. Additionally, it was held that "'in the absence of evidence that the child's interests have been fully considered,' parents may not effectively waive personal constitutional
rights of their children.""' 9
Supreme Court decisions in these cases may not only affect
due process rights prior to involuntary incarceration, but may
affect the substantive rights of children as opposed to those of
20
parents or guardians in a variety of settings.
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS

The nature and extent of the procedural rights due students
subjected to disciplinary action by public school personnel are
still in flux following the expansive decision in Goss v. Lopez.' 2'
In Goss a divided Court held that a suspension of a public school
student for even one day was not de minimis for the purpose of
requiring some form of due process from the school administration. The Court found that such exclusion from the educational
process infringed both property and liberty interests and mandated constitutional review. The student's property interest was
,founded in the state law that required both that an education be
provided and that the student attend for a specified length of
117. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), prob. juris. noted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976).
118. Id. at 1048.
119. Id. at 1048 (quoting in part from New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)).
120. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), af['d mem., 423 U.S. 907
(1975), for evaluation and rejection of the claim that parental right to determine disciplinary method is fundamental. While the Court did find that a child has a protectable

interest in "freedom from corporal punishment," it did not find a fundamental right to
be free of such discipline. Children have rights, too, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 570-76
(1975), however, not as many as adults. But see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S.
Ct. 2831 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which
indicate some development in the recognition of both substantive and procedural rights

of children. See also Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform v. Dumpson,
418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), prob. juris. noted, 425 U.S. 988 (1976).

121. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). For an optimistic view of the expansion of students' rights,
see Comment, Due Process in the PublicSchools-An Analysis of the ProceduralRequirements and a Proposalfor Implementing Them, 54 N.C.L. REv. 641 (1975).
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time each year. Similarly, there was deprivation of a liberty interest because the record of the suspension in the student's file could
affect his reputation among his peers and teachers and restrain
22
his opportunity for future education or employment.
Just four weeks later the Supreme Court decided Wood v.
Strickland,1 2 3 which held school board members and school officials personally liable for knowing violations of students' constitutional rights. This decision, again by a divided court, reinforced
the implications of Goss and significantly enhanced the proce24
dural protections for students.
Last Term the Court took a more moderate stance when,
without opinion, it affirmed Baker v. Owen. 15 In a decision by a
three-judge court, Baker held that a school child may be subjected to corporal punishment, but that the child has a "liberty
or property interest, greater than de minimis in freedom from
corporal punishment such that. . . some procedural safeguards
are required against its arbitrary imposition."' 28 The spanking
involved in Baker was modest in its effect and the due process
required was similarly modest. 27 However, a more severe case of
physical punishment is on the docket this Term. In Ingraham v.
Wright,12 a paddling with a wooden stick caused at least one of
the students to lose several days of school while he recuperated.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the paddling
did not subject the school child to a grievous loss requiring due
process. This court distinguished Goss by finding that physical
punishment, "unlike the denial itself of educational benefits,
does not subject the student to a 'grievous loss' for which constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards apply. ' 12 Though
122. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975).
123. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See also Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30, 31 n.2 (7th Cir. 1976),
petition for cert. filed 45 U.S.L.W. 3606 (Mar. 8, 1977), where the court held that damages
and equitable and declaratory relief should have been granted upon a finding that procedural due process rights of public school students had been violated by suspensions without hearings. The court relied on Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), and Hostrop
v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 963 (1976).
124. See Comment, 54 N.C.L. REv. supra note 121, at 641 & n.7.
125. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), afl'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
126. Id. at 301.
127. Id. at 302. The court required minimal procedures, clear notice, punishment in
the presence of school officials, a written explanation on request of reasons for the
punishment, and the name of the second school official present at the application of
discipline.
128. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, No. 75-6527 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
129. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 918 n.10 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, No. 75-6527
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acknowledging Baker, the majority noted that the Supreme
Court had affirmed only that part of the lower court judgment
that had been appealed to it, which did not include procedural
requirements. It refused therefore to be bound by that decision.
Five judges dissented, finding a denial of both substantive and
procedural due process, marked by a deprivation of liberty and
probability of severe psychological and physical injury.'30 The
majority, on the other hand, showed concern for the administrative burden of procedural protections when it decided there
was no liberty interest great enough to "justify the time and effort
that would have to be expended by the school in adhering to [any
required] procedures . .

.

.

SELF-HELP AND SUMMARY COURT PROCEDURES

The constitutionality of long-standing prejudgment attachment and summary repossession procedures have been in
question since the Supreme Court decisions in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.13 2 and Fuentes v. Shevin1 33 required that ade-

quate notice and a prior hearing be provided for the protection
of the debtor. The Court showed particular concern in these cases
for those whose wages would be subject to garnishment and for
the consumer of limited means who buys goods on installment.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Fuentes, noted that
some consumer goods might be considered necessities and others
luxuries but all were property and entitled to the protection of
due process. 34 Although the Court rejected distinctions in property, the context of the cases suggested the Court would limit its
constitutional scrutiny to summary procedures depriving the economically disadvantaged of physical property.
Several years after Fuentes, the Court qualified its position
requiring a predeprivation hearing in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co.

35

It has since reaffirmed the validity of the Fuentes analysis

and extended its safeguards to a business corporation. That the
property garnished was a sizeable bank account and not the
(U.S. Apr. 19, 1977). "We do not believe that infliction of a paddling subjects a schoolchild
to a grievous loss for which Fourteenth Amendment due process standards should be
applied." Id. at 917.
130. Id. at 926. James Ingraham was hit 20 times with a wooden paddle. Id. at 927.
131. Id. at 919.
132. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
133. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
134. Id. at 88-90.
135. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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wages of an improvident worker was considered immaterial to the
Court's determination in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc.'3 There the Court again held a garnishment statute
unconstitutional and required a prior hearing at which the creditor would be required to show probable cause.
The present Court will have an opportunity to review its
approach to summary court action in two cases accepted on appeal for consideration this term. In Finley v. Hernandez,'3 7 the
Court will consider the opinion of an Illinois district court finding
that the Illinois Attachment Acts was "patently violative of the
due process clause . . . ."I" The Act provided neither a preattachment hearing nor an immediate postseizure hearing. It was
therefore found to be constitutionally insufficient under either a
Mitchell or Fuentes-Di-Chemanalysis.
The Court recently decided the case of Juidice v. Vail,19
which contained a challenge to the New York Judiciary Law permitting the use of civil contempt to implement postjudgment
proceedings for the collection of money judgments. The lower
court found that the law failed to provide sufficient notice or
warning of the possible consequences of failing to appear at a
show cause hearing which could permit an adjudication of contempt and imprisonment.
In an interesting development following Di-Chem, the Third
Circuit in Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Banku4' declared Pennsylvania's foreign attachment procedures unconstitutional "[i]n
light of the latest elaborations by the Supreme Court,'14 2 just four
years after sustaining the same procedures. The scrutiny was
applied to the attachment of the funds of a corporation. The
opinion noted the language of the Supreme Court that both indi136. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
137. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Finley v. Hernandez, 96 S. Ct. 2622 (1976).
138. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 1, 2, 2a, 6, 8, 10, 14 (Smith Hurd 1963). See also
Terranova v. AVCO Financial Serv., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt. 1975) (striking
Vermont's attachment procedure); United States General, Inc. v. Arndt, 45 U.S.LW.

2081, 2082 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 4, 1976) (invalidating the Wisconsin attachment statute),
139. 405 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N.D. Ill. 1975).

140. Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) rev'd sub nom. Juidice v. Vail,
45 U.S.L.W. 4269 (Mar. 22, 1977). The Supreme Court reversed the district court for
"reasons of federalism and comity," citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). It thus extended federal court abstention
to state civil contempt proceedings. Vail was brought into federal court in a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court reserved judgment with
regard to the applicability of Younger to § 1983 suits seeking relief only for damages or to

its extension to all civil proceedings.
141. 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976).
142. Id. at 1124.
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viduals and corporations are protected from arbitrary deprivation.13 The concurring opinion preferred to invalidate the procedures under a Pennoyer v. Nefp" and InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington1 5 analysis, because "the vicissitudinous nature of
recent litigation in that Court over the constitutionality of state
provisional remedies leads me to believe that any lower court
holding grounded thereon may rest on a precarious foundation."',6
A district court in Louisiana held unconstitutional a local
ordinance assessing parking violators the costs of towing and storage without prior notice or opportunity for a hearing.147 In a
straight interest-balancing approach, the court found no specific
government need for prompt action, beyond the removal of the
car to clear the street.
CRITICS OF THE COURT AND ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT

The Supreme Court has taken an approach to procedural due
process claims that requires extensive analysis to identify in each
claim a constitutionally protected interest, to evaluate the existing procedure, and to consider by interest-balancing what constitutes sufficient procedure to protect the petitioner under the cir-

cumstances of the particular case. This type of case-by-case consideration admittedly allows great flexibility, which the Court

regards as desirable "' given the vast array of situations which
warrant due process protection. It has, however, led the Court
into inconsistency and the lower courts and litigants into uncertainty.'
143. Id. at 1128.
144. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
145. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
146. Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring).
147. Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976). See also Ricker v. United
States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Me. 1976) (Farmers Home Administration mortgage
foreclosure procedure held inadequate as best possible notice was not used: publication
was not sufficient notice when better notice was possible); Johnson v. Riverside Hotel,
Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (holding that Florida's Innkeepers' lien statutes
violate the due process clause by permitting seizure of transient guests' property without
prior notice or hearing). For a look at the status of debtor-creditor relationships when
garnishment is unavailable, see Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in
Texas: A Debtor's Paradiseor a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REv. 84 (1975).
148. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-78 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
149. See, e.g., cases cited at note 79 supra. See also Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S.
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Perhaps the full implications of the early decisions were not
realized at first. The rapid expansion of noncriminal procedural
due process examination may have taken unexpected directions

as the Court sought to treat the petitioners before it with consistency. The opinions in Arnett,50 Bishop,5 1 Mathews,52 Mitchell,"I
Enomoto,'54 and Meachum55 indicate the Court's unwillingness
to extend the application of procedural safeguards to logical limits. Though necessarily committed to a traditional due process

analysis when property or liberty interests are at stake in the face
of government action, a majority of the Justices are concerned
with the consequences of applying this analysis in the noncriminal context and are seeking a solution to their dilemma by
abridging or altering the usual examination.

Critics of this utilitarian methodology generally fall into two
categories. Some approve the present judicial determination of

procedural rights but suggest changes;'56 others would prefer to
establish an alternative system outside the federal judiciary.,
208 (1972): "The Secretary's brief lists no less than seven cases presenting [the question
of constitutional due process] with respect to disability benefits and ten cases . . . with
respect to nondisability benefits." Id. at 212 n.1. Friendly, supra note 4, at 1299:
"Goldberg v. Kelly is the lodestar in this area, but it sheds an uncertain light." (footnote
omitted).
150. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
151. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
152. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
153. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
154. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
155. Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).
156. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. CH. L. REv. 28, 46-57 (1977), discussing the limitations of utilitarianism and proposing
an alternative approach emphasizing underlying values such as the dignity of the individual and equality of treatment; Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: MonitoringAdministrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 60, 84-7 (1977),
suggesting that there be a recognized right to a reason for dismissal from government
employment subject to review for rationality only; Note, 88 HARv. L. REv., supra note 22,
at 1510, suggesting that due process adjudication should focus only on the treatment
accorded the individual and not apply an interest balancing examination. See also Symposium: Administrative Adjudication, 26 AD. L. Rev. 91 (1974), recommending a new
branch of the federal judiciary devoted to the adjudication of administrative appeals.
Nonagency related cases would still be within the present court system; however, the
burden would be substantially less.
157. Friendly, supra note 4, at 1267. Judge Friendly seems intrigued by the British
success with the investigatory hearing. In this connection, it is interesting to consider the
Veterans Administration Regulations, 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.103(c) (1974), which require
the agency to aid the petitioner to "present any evidence of advantage that claimant may
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One critic opposed to interest-balancing within the present
system noted: "When government limits an individual's constitutional right to due process in order to economize or to streamline
administration, the individual's right is sacrificed for reason of
majoritarian benefit rather than because of any genuine need to
protect the rights of others."'' 8 This commentator finds
"majoritarian benefit" an inadequate reason for abridging a citizen's right to due process. Although he would "direct the analysis
• . .toward the content"' 59 of the need for procedural safeguards,
it would nevertheless leave to the court in each case the particular
determination of the goal and the necessary procedure within the
circumstances to meet the "basic purposes"'' 0 of the constitutional right to due process. This approach, though acknowledging
the deficiency of the present utilitarian examination in constitutional terms, might further exacerbate other problems of the
courts.
A reconsideration of Arnett 6 ' solely in terms of "fairness" to
the petitioner might have afforded the claimant an impartial
adjudication prior to termination, but it is questionable if it could
effectively aid decisionmaking in a Mathews-type'82 case, where
the essential fairness of the elaborate statutory procedure was not
the only significant factor. The economic effect of an erroneous
termination must enter into such a determination under
Goldberg'13 unless such early decisions as Goldberg are reassessed. Because "procedural fairness and decency are concepts
whose meaning the judiciary must construct rather than discover"' 64 the courts may find, though using a more constitutionally justified tool, that they are still left with the task of evaluating many different procedures in as many different situations.
have overlooked." Questions are to be explored rather than refuted and all doubts are to
be resolved in favor of the claimant. 38 C.F.R. § 211(a) (1970) also precludes judicial
review. However, Gillan, Legal Issues in Veterans Benefit Legislation: Programsfor the
Elderly, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE RV.841 (1976), suggests methods of submitting agency decisions to judicial review despite the preclusion. The British investigatory bodies are unrelated to agencies. That factor may contribute to their apparent success. Friendly, supra
note 4, at 1279 n.74.
158. Note, 88 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 22, at 1535.
159. Id. at 1538.
160. Id. at 1539.
161. Arnett v.Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
162. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
163. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
164. Note, 88 H~av. L. REv., supra note 22, at 1539.
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The emphasis on the individual to the exclusion of other factors
might, however, over time, permit more consistency and reliable
precedent.
Some proponents of the judicial approach have suggested the
establishment of a separate public law branch of the federal judiciary with its own court of administrative appeals. Such courts
could concentrate on the development of a body of administrative
law and relieve the present system of a considerable burden.'
More innovative alternatives are possible. These include investigatory administrative hearings outside the related agency,' 6
ombudsmen to act as overseers, 6 ' and arbitration.' 8 The nonadversarial nature of these alternatives may be permissible if the
new interests are classified as a form of property not totally analogous to the traditional constitutional concept of property, and
therefore not warranting the full panoply of due process protection. "Indeed, there is reason to question whether a procedural
system inspired by the private property, free enterprise and noninterventionist values of Adam Smith should be utilized to
adjudicate 'property' rights that emerge from the managed economy inspired by John Maynard Keynes." ' 9
Once having articulated and justified distinctions in the interests at stake and, further, having identified goals as necessarily
compatible with the management of public resources,' 0 it could
then become possible to "develop new procedural systems that do
not sacrifice traditional values"' 7 ' but insure fairness while
"negativing the fear of unchecked centralized power."'7 2 This
approach, while concerned for the rights of the individual,
basically incorporates interest-balancing into its conceptual
structure, though taking it out of the decisionmaking.
The primary obstacle to the nonadversarial methods of dispute settlement may be traditional reliance and confidence in the
judicial trial-type procedure. '13 Although arbitration has become
165. But see note 156 supra; Symposium, 26 AD. L. REv., supra note 156, at 91.

166. Friendly, supra note 4, at 1279.
167. Verkuil, supra note 1.

168. Sarat & Grossman, Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication, 69 AMER. POL. Scm. REv. 1200, 1210 n.71 (1975). See generally Abel,
A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAw & Soc'Y 217 (1974).
169. Verkuil, supra note 1, at 853.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 855.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 854. "Distrust of the bureaucracy is surely one reason for the clamor for
adversary proceedings in the United States." Friendly, supra note 4, at 1279.
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an accepted procedure, enforcement is still dependent upon the
courts. Investigatory hearings which are mandated to seek facts,
promote petitioner's plea, and decline an adversarial role may
nevertheless not evoke the respect traditionally given the judicial
adversarial hearing in our culture.
If, as recent decisions indicate, the Supreme Court is in general retreating from its former expansive policy toward the procedural protection of individual rights jeopardized by government
action, alternative systems for safeguarding such rights may receive support. "There is need for experimentation, particularly
for the use of the investigative model, for empirical studies, and
for avoiding absolutes.' 74
CONCLUSION

The twentieth century has seen a marked growth in government and its influence in the affairs of individuals. In order to
protect individuals from arbitrary action by the government, the
Supreme Court came to acknowledge as property or liberty many
interests of individuals that had not previously been so defined.
Once having defined interests in such terms, the Court then accorded such interests the protection of the due process clause of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The recognition of these
new rights increased litigation seeking procedural protection. The
Court gradually extended constitutional protection to a broad
range of interests. The Court was led by its constitutional analysis into evaluating the personnel policies and procedures of local
and state government and arms of government as well as federal
agencies. It has in addition considered the procedural policies of
such diverse institutions as prisons, schools, hospitals, courts,
welfare agencies, licensing agencies and parole boards, in any
situation where property or liberty interests have been abridged
or terminated.
The Court is caught in a dilemma. Once an interest is defined as property or liberty it deserves constitutional procedural
174. Friendly, supra note 4, at 1316. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), holding the constitutional right to due process prohibits the state from denying
access to the Court for divorce by insisting on court costs or fees.
American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of individual
rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom
or the will of strategically placed individuals, but on the common-law model. It
is to the courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look
for the implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.
Id. at 375.
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protection. To accord all such interests full protection of the due
process clause creates administrative, fiscal, and federalism problems that the current Court finds unacceptable in many situations.
There are alternative approaches. The Court might stop its
present interest-balancing analysis and mandate sufficient due
process irrespective of cost or efficiency. This benefits the public
in the most meaningful way by enhancing its respect for government. The Court can narrow the definitions of liberty and property. This, however, would leave many important individual interests subject to arbitrary and capricious government action.
The Court can give the new interests which generally are related
to or defined in terms of public administration, a status parallel
to or different from traditional interests. New means of settling
disputes involving these interests could then be established. The
courts could remain as a last resort with a strong presumption
that the alternative method has been just.
The strong historical reliance of our society on the adversary
system suggests that the Court must continue to develop an approach to noncriminal due process analysis which will meet the
criticism of uncertainty and inconsistency leveled against it, and
yet offer that protection of individual interests which inspires
confidence in government.
Renee G. Mayer
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